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The article also demonstrates that claimants represented by immigration consultants are less likely to succeed
than claimants represented by lawyers. This, combined with evidence that the immigration consulting
industry has not established adequate procedures to enforce standards of professional conduct, leads the
author to argue that immigration consultants should not provide unsupervised representation to refugee
claimants. In short, the author argues that counsel play an important role in the refugee determination
process. Accordingly, measures should be taken to ensure that refugee claimants can access competent counsel
while simultaneously ensuring that unqualified counsel do not play a role in life and death refugee decision
making.
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The Role of Counsel in Canada's
Refugee Determination System:
An Empirical Assessment
SEAN REHAAG*
This article examines the role of counsel in Canada's refugee determination process through
an investigation of over 70,000 refugee decisions from 2005 to 2009. The article demonstrates
that counsel is a key factor driving successful outcomes. The article also shows that legal
aid programs are increasingly restrictive in funding legal representation for refugee claimants. The author argues that these restrictions put the lives of refugees at risk. The article
also demonstrates that claimants represented by immigration consultants are less likely to
succeed than claimants represented by lawyers. This, combined with evidence that the immigration consulting industry has not established adequate procedures to enforce standards
of professional conduct, leads the author to argue that immigration consultants should not
provide unsupervised representation to refugee claimants. In short, the author argues that
counsel play an important rote in the refugee determination process. Accordingly, measures
should be taken to ensure that refugee claimants can access competent counsel while
simultaneously ensuring that unqualified counsel do not play a rote in life and death refugee
decision making.
Le present article examine, par te biais de t'examen de plus de 70 000 d6terminations du
statut de r~fugi6 qui se sont d6roules de 2005 6 2009. le r6le du conseit dans le syst&me de
d6termination du statut de r~fugi6 du Canada. Larticle d6montre que le conseil exerce un
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rGle essentieL aux danouements positifs. Larticle damontre 6galement que les programmes
d'aide juridique sont de plus en plus restrictifs en ce qui concerne le financement de La
repr6sentation judiciaire des demandeurs d'asile. Lauteur estime que ces restrictions mettent
[avie des rafugias en p6riL. Larticle damontre 6galement que les demandeurs reprasentas
par des consultants en immigration ont moins de chance de raussir que les demandeurs
reprasentas par des avocats. Lauteur soutient aussi que le secteur des consultants en
immigration na pas instaur6 de proc6dures ad6quates pour faire respecter les normes de
conduite professionnelle. Ces constatations manent ['auteur 6 avancer que les consultants
en immigration ne devraient pas fournir de reprasentation aux demandeurs d'asile sans
surveillance. En rasum, lauteur soutient que leconseiljoue un rGle important dans le systame
de d6termination du statut de r6fugi6. Par cons6quent, des mesures devraient 6tre prises
pour s'assurer que les demandeurs d'asile puissent avoir accas aux services d'un avocat
compatent, tout en s'assurant qu'un conseil non qualifi6 n'exerceaucun rale lors de prise de
decision de vie ou de mort concernant un rafugi6.
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REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS INVOLVE life and death decisions. If adjudicators
fail properly to accord refugee status to those who meet the refugee definition,
claimants may be sent to countries where they face persecution, torture, or death.
It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Singh v Minister of
Employment and Immigration, held that refugee determinations-which engage
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security of the person-must comply
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with robust procedural due process norms required by the principles of fundamental justice.I
This article examines the role of counsel in Canada's refugee determination
process in light of the importance of these determinations. One of the questions it
considers is whether it is appropriate that Canada does not guarantee publicly funded
legal counsel for all refugee claimants who lack the resources to hire counsel on
their own. Another is whether it is appropriate to allow immigration consultants
with no legal training to represent refugee claimants before the Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB), considering the potentially devastating consequences of
erroneous refugee determinations.
The article seeks to answer these and other questions regarding the role of
counsel in Canada's refugee determination process through an empirical analysis
of the relation between types of counsel and refugee claim outcomes at the IRB
from 2005 to 2009. The empirical analysis examines data obtained through
access to information requests made to the IRB, as well as through similar
requests to legal aid programs in the main host provinces for refugee claimants.
The article demonstrates that competent counsel is a key factor driving
successful outcomes in refugee claims. The article also shows that provincial legal
aid programs are increasingly restrictive in funding legal representation for refugee
claimants who cannot afford counsel. The article argues that taken together, the
increasing restrictions on legal aid put the lives of refugees at risk. Given the
serious financial constraints faced by provincial legal aid programs, and because
refugee determinations fall within federal jurisdiction, the article suggests that
the federal government should transfer sufficient funds to provincial legal aid
programs to guarantee representation for all refugee claimants who meet reasonable financial eligibility requirements. The article also demonstrates that refugee
claimants represented by immigration consultants are less likely to succeed than
refugee claimants represented by lawyers. Moreover, refugee claimants represented by immigration consultants are more likely to withdraw their claims or
have their claims declared abandoned. As a result-and in light of evidence that
the immigration consulting industry has not established adequate procedures
to ensure that consultants adhere to standards of professional competence and
professional conduct-the article contends that immigration consultants should
not be authorized to provide unsupervised representation in Canada's refugee
determination system.
In short, the article argues that counsel play an important role in the refugee
determination process and that, accordingly, measures should be taken to ensure
1.

[19851 1 SCR 177 [Singh].
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that refugee claimants can gain access to competent counsel and that unqualified
counsel do not play a role in life and death refugee decision making.

I. THE CONTEXT: COUNSEL IN CANADA'S REFUGEE
DETERMINATION SYSTEM
A. CANADA'S CURRENT REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM
Canada is a party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.2 As such,
subject to limited exceptions, Canada is obliged as a matter of international law
to provide refugee protection to foreign nationals who have a well-founded fear
of being persecuted abroad on account of their race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.3
Canada's immigration legislation aspires to meet Canadas international
obligations by adopting the international refugee definition and establishing
procedures to accord refugee protection to those meeting that definition. 4 In
addition, the legislation includes those who face risks to their lives, risks of torture,
or risks of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under subsidiary grounds
for protection.5 The legislation also sets out exclusions from refugee protection
for persons who pose security risks or who have engaged in serious criminality or
violations of human rights.'
In broad strokes, Canada's current refugee determination process operates as
follows. 7 When foreign nationals in Canada first apply for refugee protection, an
immigration officer determines whether they are eligible to make refugee claims. 8
The main grounds of ineligibility include: having already made unsuccessful refugee claims in Canada; having refugee status in other countries to
which they can be safely returned; coming to Canada via a designated safe third
country; and being inadmissible due to security concerns, serious criminality,
or human rights violations. 9 In most circumstances, unless claimants are found to

2.

28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (accession by Canada 4 June 1969).

3.
4.

Ibid, art 1, as amended by ProtocolRelating to the Status ofRefugees, 31 January 1967, 606
UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967), art 1.
Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct, SC 2001, c 27, ss 3(2)(b), 96 [IRPA].

5.

Ibid, s 97.

6. Ibid, s 98.
7.
8.
9.

For an overview of the process see Sasha Baglay & Martin Jones, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2007) at 215-53.
IRPA, supra note 4, ss 99-100.
For the full list of grounds of ineligibility see ibid, s 101.
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be ineligible within three working days, they are deemed eligible.'" Due in part to
these very tight timelines, almost all applicants are determined to be eligible, and
their claims are referred to the IRB for determination."
The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the IRB is tasked with determining
whether those who are eligible to make refugee claims in Canada meet the refugee
definition or otherwise qualify for protection under the subsidiary grounds
provision. At the same time, the RPD must determine whether claimants fall
within the exclusions from refugee protection.12 To make these determinations,
the RPD requires claimants to submit a Personal Information Form (PIF) with
extensive biographical details within twenty-eight days of having their claim
referred. 3 Included in this PIF is a section where claimants set out their reasons
for seeking refugee protection in Canada in narrative form. 14 In advance of their
refugee hearings, claimants may submit documentary evidence supporting their
claims, including evidence regarding conditions in their home countries."5 The
RPD also maintains databases containing country condition information 6 that
may become part of the documentary record on the RPD's initiative, as can
documents provided by representatives of the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (the Minister). 7
Several months 8 after claims for refugee protection are initially made, the
RPD holds hearings to determine whether claimants qualify for refugee protection.'9 IRB members, who are appointed by the Governor-in-Council and who
10.

fbid, s 100.

11.

Canada, Department of Justice, Representationfor Immigrantsand Refugee Claimants:Final
Study Report (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2002) [DOJ, Representation] (paraphrasing
Citizenship and Immigration Canada officials' assertion that "the threshold for eligibility to

have a refugee claim determined by the RPD is so low that virtually every claim received is
found eligible" at 22).
12. IRPA, supra note 4, ss 96-98, 107, 170.
13.

Refugee ProtectionDivision Rules, SOR/2002-228, ss 5-6 [RPD Rules].

14. Immigration and Refugee Board, "Personal Information Form," online: <http://www.irb.
gc.ca/eng/tribunal/ form/Documents/form 189_e.pdf> at 9.
15. RPD Rules, supra note 13, ss 7, 29.
16. Immigration and Refugee Board, "Research Program," online: <http://www.irb.gc.calEngl
resrec/respro/Pages/index.aspx>.
17. All documents must be disclosed to the claimant in advance of the hearing. RPD Rules, supra
note 13, s 29.

18. For fiscal year 2009-2010, the average processing time for refugee claims referred to the RPD
was 19.2 months. Immigration and Refugee Board, PerformanceReportfor the PeriodEnding
March 31, 2010 (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2010) at 16 [IRB, 2009-

2010 PerformanceReport].
19. IRPA, supra note 4, s 170(b). It is also possible for the RPD to grant (but not refuse) refugee
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2°
serve on good behaviour for fixed terms, preside over RPD refugee hearings.
21
IRB members are not required to have legal training, and many do not. A
22
representative of the Minister may also participate in the hearing. However,
the Minister's representatives typically only participate where there is an issue of
23
exclusion due to security concerns, criminality, or violations of human rights.
When the Minister is not represented, hearings are not adversarial, as no one
argues the case against the claimant.2' Moreover, hearings are meant to be
informal and expeditious, and as such the RPD is not bound by technical rules
of evidence.2 The main purpose of these informal and typically non-adversarial
hearings is to determine whether claimants are credible-in other words, to
26
determine whether the narratives recounted in their PIFs are true.
Where IRB members determine that claimants do not qualify for refugee
protection, reasons must be provided (in positive decisions, reasons need only
be provided on request). 27 Within fifteen days of receiving the decision, both the
claimant and the Minister may apply to the Federal Court for leave to judicid29
ally review an RPD refugee determination. 28 Leave is rarely granted, however.
Where leave is denied, no hearing is held, no reasons are provided, and there
is no further appeal." In cases where leave is granted, the grounds for judicial
review are narrowly restricted to legal errors and procedural defects (whereas,
as noted above, most cases turn on credibility determinations)." Also, in cases

20.

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

status without holding a hearing. See RPD Rules, supra note 13, s 19.
IRPA, supra note 4, s 153. For a discussion of the IRB appointment process, see Sean Rehaag,
"Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication" (2008) 39 Ottawa L Rev 335 at
355-58 [Rehaag, "Troubling"].
Only 10 per cent of board members are required to be "members of at least five years
standing at the bar of a province." IRPA, supra note 4, s 153(4).
RPD Rules, supra note 13, s 25.
Where the RPD is aware that such issues may arise at the hearing or where such an issue does
arise at the hearing, the RPD must notify the Minister to give the Minister the opportunity
to intervene (ibid,ss 23-24).
Benitez v Canada (Minister ofCitizenship andImmigration), (2006), [2007] 1 FCR 107 at
paras 63-64.
IRPA, supra note 4, ss 162(2), 70(g).
Baglay & Jones, supra note 7 at 240.
IRPA, supra note 4, ss 169(d)-(e).
Ibid, s 72.
For example, in 2009 leave was granted in 582 out of 4,174 applications to judicially
review refugee determinations (13.9 per cent). Federal Court of Canada, Statistics:Activity
Summary-January 1 to December31, 2009, online: <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/
portal/page/portal/fcf..en/Statistics-dec09>.
IRPA, supranote 4, s 72.
FederalCourts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(4) (setting out the limited grounds ofjudicial review).
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where leave is granted, it is not possible to appeal the judicial review decision to
the Federal Court of Appeal or beyond unless the Federal Court judge issuing the
judicial review decision certifies that the case raises a serious issue of general importance." Given all these restrictions, in the vast majority of cases the RPD's
refugee determination is effectively final, and claimants who are unsuccessful at
the RPD generally become vulnerable to removal from Canada.3"
B. UPCOMING REVISIONS TO CANADA'S REFUGEE DETERMINATION
SYSTEM
The refugee determination system in Canada will undergo extensive revisions
in the coming months. 3 The most significant changes under the revised refugee
determination process" include:
"

"

*

Rather than preparing a PIF with details of their claim, claimants
will instead attend a pre-hearing interview with a civil servant at the
RPD. The interviewer will gather information about the claim and
will prepare a report about the alleged facts grounding the claim.
Interviews will also be recorded. Interviews can occur as early as
36
fifteen days after refugee claims are referred to the RPD.
RPD hearings will be held before civil servants. Unlike under the
current refugee determination system, these civil servants will not
be Governor-in-Council appointees serving for fixed terms.37
It is anticipated that RPD hearings will be held for most claimants
within ninety days. However, for claimants from countries designated
by the Minister, hearings will occur within sixty days rather than
38
ninety days.

32. IRPA, supra note 4, s 74(d).
33. For a discussion of removal procedures see generally Baglay & Jones, supra note 7 at 323-47.
34. BalancedRefugeeReform Act, SC 2010, c 8 (assented to 29 June 2010, not yet in force)

[Reform Act].
In addition to changes to the refugee determination process, there are a number of
other changes, the biggest of which includes new limits on requests for exemptions from
immigration requirements on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (ibid,s 4, amending
IRPA, supra note 4, s 25) and restrictions on pre-removal risk assessments (ibid, s 15,
amending IRPA, supra note 4, s 112).
36. Ibid, s 11(2), amending IRPA, supra note 4, s 100(4).
6
37. Ibid, s 2 , amending IRPA, supra note 4, s 169.1.
38. These targeted timelines are not contained in Bill C-II but were announced by the
government. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Backgrounder: Bill C-11: The
BalancedRefugee Reform Act," online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
35.
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"

*

*

The Minister may designate particular countries, parts of countries,
and classes of nationals from particular countries. Designation may
occur only where the number of claims for refugee protection by
nationals of the country exceeds a number set by regulations and
where the success rate of refugee claims for nationals of the country
is lower than a percentage set by regulations. In other words,
designation may only occur for countries that produce relatively
large numbers of unsuccessful refugee claims. In addition, in
designating countries, the Minister is required to take into account
factors such as the human rights record of the country and the
availability of state protection in the country. 9
Where the RPD is of the view that a refugee claim is "clearly
but may also declare
fraudulent" it may not only reject the claim
'
4
the claim to be "manifestly'unfounded.'
RPD refugee determinations can be appealed on questions of law
or fact to a newly created Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB,
whose members will be Governor-in-Council appointees serving
for fixed terms. Appeals will be paper-based unless documentary
evidence establishes that there is a serious issue of credibility at stake
that is central to the determination and that would, ifaccepted,
justify granting or refusing the claim for refugee protection. The
government anticipates that appeals will be decided within 120
days (unless a hearing is held) for most claims and within 30
days (unless a hearing is held) for claimants whose claims were
determined to be "manifestly unfounded" by the RPD or who are
nationals of countries designated by the Minister."

In summary, the revisions aim to dramatically speed up the refugee determination process, especially for claimants from designated countries and for
claimants whose claims are found to be manifestly unfounded. At the same time,
the revisions create a new level of appeal (in addition to judicial reviews to the
Federal Court), which, in principle, may help to correct errors made by the RPD
not only regarding issues of law but also regarding factual findings. In announcing
that Parliament passed the revisions, the Minister, Jason Kenney, asserted:
backgrounders/2010/2010-06-29.asp> [CIC, "Reform"].
39. Reform Act, supra note 34, s 12, amending IRPA, supra note 4, s 109.1.
40. Reform Act, supra note 34, s 11.1, amending IRPA, supra note 4, s 107.1.
4
41. Reform Act, supra note 34, s 13, amending IRPA, supra note , s 110. See also CIC,
"Reform," supra note 38.
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While Canada already has one of the most generous refugee systems in the world,
these reforms [will] lead to faster protection for victims of torture and persecution,
and faster removal of failed asylum claimants including those who try to abuse
Canada's generosity... . Failed asylum claimants [will] have access to a new factbased appeal at the Refugee Appeal Division, while taxpayers [will] save an estimated
$1.8 billion over 5 years because'Tailed claimants [will] no longer be able to stay in
2
Canada for years.'

C.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER CANADA'S IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION

Canada's immigration legislation-in both its current and soon to be implemented
versions-provides that refugee claimants in proceedings before the IRB "may, at
3
their own expense, be represented by a barrister or solicitor or other counsel."4
There are two key points to note about this provision. First, the provision does
not provide refugee claimants with a right to publicly funded legal representation.
Rather, it provides the right to counsel only at the claimants' expense. As
discussed in detail in Part III(A), below, several provincial legal aid programs
fund legal representation for some refugee claimants who cannot afford
counsel. However, legal aid is not universally available for representation in
refugee proceedings, and, as a result, many refugee claimants go unrepresented
at their hearings.
Second, the provision leaves open the possibility that refugee claimants
may be represented at the IRB by persons who are not lawyers. Regulations
accompanying the legislation specify that non-lawyers may serve as counsel
42.

43.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Balanced Refugee Reform Passes
Final Hurdle in the Senate, Launches Summer Tour to Promote Refugee Resettlement" (29
June 20 10) online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/ english/department/media/
releases/2010/2010-06-29a.asp>.
IRPA, supra note 4, s 167. See also, Reform Act, supra note 34 , s 23 (maintaining this right
and adding that "proceedings" at which claimants have the right to self-funded counsel
include the initial fifteen-day interview at the RPD). A strong argument can be made that
the right to counsel at refugee hearings is required by s 7 of the Canadian Charterof Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. See Baglay & Jones, supra note 7 at 254, citing Mathon
v Canada (MEI) (1998), 38 Admin L Rev 193 at para 208 (FCTD), Pinard J. See also
Dehghani v Canada (Ministry ofEmployment and Immigration), [ 1993] 1 SCR 1053 at
para 48 ("the right to counsel under s. 7 may apply in other cases besides those which are
encompassed by s. 10(b), for example in cases involving the right to counsel at a [refugee]
hearing"); New Brunswick (Ministerof Healthand Community Services) v G (), [ 1999] 3
SCR 46 [G (J)] (holding that there is a right to counsel under s 7 of the Charter in complex
proceedings where fundamental rights are at stake).
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either if they are members in good standing of the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants (CSIC) or if they do not charge fees." As a result, some
refugee claimants are represented at their refugee hearings either by immigration
consultants or by unpaid representatives (such as family members, friends, or
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that assist claimants). However, as
noted in more detail in Part III(B) below, representation by non-lawyers has
proven controversial in the refugee law setting. With respect to immigration
consultants, concerns have been raised about the inability of CSIC to ensure that
its members provide quality representation and meet their professional obligations.
With regard to unpaid representatives, there are similar concerns regarding quality of
representation, and there is an additional concern that some purportedly unpaid
representatives may in fact be charging fees for their services, thereby avoiding
even the limited oversight offered by CSIC.

II. THE EFFECT OF COUNSEL ON REFUGEE CLAIM
OUTCOMES
In this context, the present study investigates the effect of counsel on outcomes
in refugee claims. It is hoped that this information will be of use in evaluating
current trends in legal aid policies across Canada as well as in developing policies
to regulate immigration consultants.
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES
There are no existing published empirical studies on the effect of counsel on
refugee claim outcomes in Canada. However, an influential study canvassed
the issue in the US refugee determination system." In that study, Jaya RamjiNogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Phillip G. Schrag examined over 78,000
asylum cases in US immigration courts to determine the extent to which certain
biographical information about deciding judges-including gender, prior
work experience, and political party of appointment-as well as claimant
demographics influenced outcomes." The authors of the study concluded that
representation is a key driver of successful asylum applications in US immigration courts:

44. Immigration and Refugee ProtectionRegulations, SOR/2002-227, ss 2, 13.1 [IRPA
Regulations].
45. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I Schoenholtz & Phillip G Schrag, "Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication" (2007) 60 Stan L Rev 295.
46. Ibid at 327.
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[W]hether an asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most important
factor affecting the outcome of her case. Represented asylum seekers were granted
asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for
those without legal counsel. The regression analyses confirmed that, with all other
variables in the study held constant, represented asylum seekers were substantially
4 7
more likely to win their case than those without representation.

The US study also found that quality of representation varied significantly.
For example, whereas the success rate for represented claimants overall was 45.6
per cent, asylum applicants represented by.Georgetown University's legal clinic
were successful .89 per cent of the time, and asylum applicants represented on a
pro bono basis by large law firms working with Human Rights First were successful
96 per cent of the time. 8 After examining how these programs select clients, the
authors of the study attributed the dramatically higher success rates not to
patterns in client selection but rather to the resources that not-for-profit counsel put
into gathering documentary evidence and obtaining expert opinions on country
conditions and on the physical and mental health of applicants. 9
While there are no existing comparable studies regarding first instance
refugee decisions in Canada, a recent study found that representation plays
a central role in the outcomes of applications for leave to have IRB decisions
reviewed in Federal Court."0 In that study, Jon B. Gould, Colleen Sheppard,
and Johannes Wheeldon examined more than six hundred such applications
filed in the Federal Court in 2003. The authors measured correlations between
outcomes and several variables, including claimant demographics, judge demographics, and details regarding counsel. This analysis revealed that "[l]itigants
who were represented by an attorney were much more likely to be granted leave
than were the self-represented, and those claimants with an experienced law
firm behind them were more likely to receive a favourable leave ruling."5 ' The
authors noted that the strong effect of counsel on outcomes in.
Federal Co.urt
leave applications raises serious questions regarding the fairness of Canada's
refugee determination system:
A system designed to provide due process of law ought not to be tilted in favor of

those who can hire an experienced lawyer, and yet that is exactly what is happening
when applicants appear before the FCC [Federal Court of Canada] seeking leave for
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Ibid at 340 [citations omitted].
Ibidat 340-41.
Ibid at 341.
Jon B Gould, Colleen Sheppard & Johannes Wheeldon, "A Refugee from Justice? Disparate
Treatment in the Federal Court of Canada' (2010) 32 Law & Pol'y 454.
Ibid at 468.
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immigration or asylum cases. The odds are thirty-two times greater that a represented
claimant will be granted leave over someone who appears by him-/herself or with a
consultant... . Furthermore, women are more likely than men to go unrepresented
before the FCC, which only exacerbates the disproportionate effects of these
52
processes on litigants.

This last point regarding possible intersections between gender and the ability
to secure counsel is especially noteworthy, as the study also found that female
applicants are less likely to obtain leave than male applicants.53 Unfortunately,
this would appear to reflect a broader phenomenon whereby women confront
disproportionate challenges securing counsel on a variety of legal issues that
5
impact upon important rights and interests.
It must be said that the findings of both the US study and the Canadian
Federal Court study are worrisome considering the stakes in refugee determinations. If counsel is an important factor affecting outcomes in both US asylum

applications and Canadian Federal Court leave applications in immigration and
refugee cases, then it stands to reason that counsel may have similar effects on
refugee claim outcomes at Canada's RPD. The present study attempts to determine
whether that is the case, and if so, what should be done about it.
B. METHODOLOGY

Empirical studies of first instance refugee determinations in Canada are
methodologically challenging because refugee hearings are typically closed to
the public. 5 Moreover, only a small fraction (around 0.1 per cent) of RPD refugee
decisions are selected for publication by the IRB, which redacts the decisions to
remove identifying information and translates the decisions into both official languages prior to publication. 6 In addition, this small pool of published decisions
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

Ibid at 475-76.
Ibidat 468-69.
See e.g. G (J),supra note 43 at paras 113-15, EHeureux-Dub6 J concurring (noting that
women face particular challenges accessing justice due to the feminization of poverty); Mary
Jane Mossman, Karen Schucher & Claudia Schmeing, "Comparing and Understanding
Legal Aid Priorities: a Paper Prepared for Legal Aid Ontario" (2010) 29 Windsor Rev Legal
Soc Issues 149 at 213-14 (noting that the disproportionate allocation of legal.aid to criminal
law cases at the expense of areas such as family law results in women having less access to
representation where key interests are at stake).
IRPA, supra note 4, s 166(c).
Published decisions are available on the IRB's website. Immigration and Refugee Board, "Reflex,"
online: <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.calEngltribunal/decisions/Pageslindex.aspx>. From 1 April 2009
to 31 March 2010, 35 RPD decisions were published in Reflex. During this same period, the
RPD finalized 28,500 cases. IRB, 2009-2010 Performance Report, supra note 18 at 15.
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is not representative of the full caseload at the RPD because decisions are selected
for publication only when, in the IRB's view, they are particularly well-crafted in
terms of stating the law, they raise an issue that is common to a number of cases,
or they raise novel or unusual issues."7 Also, as noted above, the RPD only issues
reasons when it refuses refugee status or where the Minister or the claimant
requests reasons in positive decisions.5 8 As a result, published decisions will
disproportionately be drawn from a pool of negative decisions.5 9 Taken together,
these limitations on published decisions mean that in order to gather representative
samples of the full RPD caseload, empirical studies on first instance refugee
decisions in Canada need to draw from data beyond published decisions.
6
To this end, the present study used formal access to information requests
to obtain information on RPD decisions from the IRB's internal database. Two
different databases were established through these requests. First, a database was
created with information on all principal claimant6 refugee determinations from
2005 to 2009. The -following information was obtained from the IRB for all
principal claimant refugee determinations made by the RPD during this period:
(1) IRB file number; (2) date of referral to the RPD; (3) name of counsel; (4)
name of IRB member; (5) whether the case was categorized by the IRB as involving gender-related persecution; (6) gender of principal claimant; (7) country
of persecution; (8) outcome; and (9) date of decision.62 Second, a database was
created with information on all counsel who represented claimants before the
RPD from 2005 to 2009. Where it was available, the following information was
obtained from the IRB's database on counsel: (1) name; (2) firm; (3) city; (4)
63
province; and (5) type (i.e., consultant, lawyer, et cetera).
57.

Immigration and Refugee Board, "About Reflex," online: <http://www.irbcisr.gc.ca:8080/
ReFlex/AboutReflex. aspx#reflex03> at para 3.4 [IRB, "About Reflex"].
58. See text accompanying note 27.
59. The IRB indicates, however, that it attempts to publish "a balance of positive and
negative decisions of the Refugee Protection Division, so as to make the positive decisions
jurisprudence more readily accessible to decision-makers and staff." IRB, 'About Reflex,"
supra note 57 at para 3.3.
60. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-l, s 4.
61. Refugee claimants are categorized by the IRB as either principal claimants or dependants.
Focusing on principal claimants has the advantage of ensuring that data are counted only
once for each RPD decision-which means that decisions are not weighted according to
the number of dependants. There are, however, disadvantages to this approach as well. In
particular, women and children are more frequently categorized as dependants, meaning that
fewer women and children will be accounted for in studies that focus on principal claimants.
62. Letter from Debora Eisl, Director, Access to Information and Privacy, Immigration and Refugee
Board to Sean Rehaag (13 October 2010) IRB File #: A-2010-00089 (on file with author).
63. Letter from Debora Eisl, Director, Access to Information and Privacy, Immigration and
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The two databases were combined, requiring extensive consolidation of
multiple name spellings for thousands of counsel. Information on counsel who
were listed in the first database but not in the second was, wherever possible,
obtained from online sources. Also, wherever possible, counsel type indicated
by the IRB was verified (and sometimes corrected) using online directories of
the relevant professional bodies. 6 Finally, counsel for each case was coded into
four categories: (1) lawyer; (2) consultant; (3) none; and (4) other. It should be
noted that the fourth category served as a residual category that included
several different types of counsel other than individual lawyers and consultants
including law firms, consulting firms, paralegals working for either type of firm,
volunteers for NGOs, family and friends of claimants, and counsel for whom
information could not be located. 65 The resulting combined database included
70,797 principal claimant RPD decisions and 1,770 counsel. An analysis was
undertaken on the combined database.
Three aspects of the analysis bear particular emphasis. First, because some
counsel specialize in claims from particular regions of the world, some variation
in rate of success of refugee claims is to be expected (e.g., counsel who specialized
from 2005 to 2009 in claims from Mexico will understandably have lower grant
rates than counsel who specialized in claims from Somalia during the same
period). To account for this variability, the study calculated predicted grant rates
for various subsets of cases (e.g., all cases where claimants were represented by
lawyers) using the yearly country of origin average grant rate for each case within
that subset of cases. As a result, it was possible to determine, for example, whether.
a particular type of counsel had higher or lower success rates than would be
predicted based on the countries of origin of the claimants represented by that
type of counsel. It should be noted, however, that these predicted grant rates do
not take into account several factors that likely affect outcomes. For example,
previous research indicates that gender (both of claimants and adjudicators), the
identity of adjudicators, the adjudicator's political party of appointment, the
region of the country in which claims are made, and various other factors affect
refugee claim outcomes.66 It would be interesting to gather more comprehensive
Refugee Board to Sean Rehaag (3 November 2010) IRB File #: A-2010-00119 (on file
with author).
64. The relevant professional bodies include the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants
and the law societies of all provinces and territories.
65. Because of the diversity of types of counsel in this residual category, statistics regarding
counsel categorized as "other" should be interpreted with caution. See text accompanying
note 70.
66. See e.g. Sean Rehaag, "Do Women Judges Really Make a Difference: An empirical analysis of
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data and conduct sophisticated statistical analysis to examine the relative weight
of these factors as well as to consider interactions between them. Such analysis,
however, faces a number of methodological challenges given the very large
number of variables-many of which cannot be assumed to be independent
of one another-that would need to be taken into account. For the purposes of
this study, to avoid these methodological challenges, a simplified approach was
adopted, using yearly country of origin average grant rates as a main predictor of
refugee claim outcomes, setting aside for the moment other possible predictors.
Second, throughout the study, grant rates and success rates (terms that are
used interchangeably), as well as yearly country of origin averages, refer to the
sum of positive decisions as a proportion of the sum of positive and negative
decisions, excluding claims that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved. The reason for including only positive and negative decisions is that
grant rates calculated as a proportion of all claims finalized can be significantly
distorted where the RPD schedules few hearings on the merits for claimants from
a particular country. The reason for the distortion is that over time, claims that
are withdrawn or abandoned accumulate, overshadowing the few claims decided
on the merits, thereby artificially reducing grant rates. To avoid these distortions,
the present study calculates grant rates based only on cases decided on their
merits. It should be noted that the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees uses the same approach when reporting "recognition rates."6
Third, when comparing grant rates, the study reports relative risk, expressed
in terms of per cent more likely to succeed. Mathematically, this is:
((Grant Rate A / Grant Rate B) - 1) x 100

Thus, for example, if one group of claimants has a 50 per cent grant rate and a
second group of claimants has a 40 per cent grant rate, the study would report
that the first group of claimants is 25 per cent more likely to succeed than the
second group of claimants, i.e. ((50/40) - 1) x 100. It should be noted that percentages in excess of 100 per cent will be reported. Some readers may prefer to
think of such percentages in terms of times more likely, which can be determined
by dividing the reported percentage by 100 (e.g., 400 per cent more likely is four
times more likely).

67.

gender and outcomes in refugee determinations," CJWL [forthcoming] [Rehaag, "Gender"];
Rehaag, "Troubling," supra note 20; Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 50; RamjiNogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 45.
See e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR StatisticalYearbook 2009
(October 2010), online: <www.unhcr.org/statistics>.
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TABLE 1: REFUGEE CLAIM OUTCOMES BY YEAR 12005-20091
Year

Positive

Negative

Abandoned/
Withdrawn

Otherwise
Resolved

Decisions

Abandoned/
Withdrawn
Rate (%)

Grant
Rate (%)

2005

7,678

7,608

2,516

51

17,853

14.1

50.2

2006

6,127

5,490

1,853

64

13,534

13.7

52.7

2007

4,133

3,535

1,922

62

9,652

19.9

53.9

2008

5,138

4,198

2,796

77

12,209

22.9

55.0

2009

7,352

6,105

4,008

84

17,549

22.8

54.6

Total

30,428

26,936

13,095

338

70,797

18.5

53.0

Excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved

C.

RESULTS

To provide context for the findings regarding the effect of counsel on outcomes,
the first thing that should be noted is the overall trend in outcomes at the RPD
during the period of the study. As Table 1 indicates, the proportion of refugee
claims withdrawn or declared abandoned increased substantially from 2005 to
2009. The same period also saw a small increase in the grant rate.
1.

COUNSELTYPE

Table 2 summarizes the findings with regard to counsel type. As it indicates, although most refugee claimants from 2005 to 2009 were represented by lawyers,
a significant (but much smaller) number were represented by consultants or uncategorized counsel or were not represented.

TABLE 2: REFUGEE CLAIM OUTCOMES BY COUNSEL TYPE 12005-20091
Counsel
Type

Decisions

Decisions (%)

Abandoned/
Withdrawn Rate (%)

Grant Rate
(%)

Predicted Grant
Rate (%)"

Lawyer

56,029

79.1

12.7

57.0

55.5

Counsultant

5,707

8.1

16.1

33.5

39.5

None

7,624

10.8

62.9

15.2

31.7

Other

1,190

1.7

18.1

52.9

56.1

Total

70,797

100.0

18.5

53.0

53.0

Excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved
Based on yearly country of origin grant rates, excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved
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Table 2 also shows that counsel type had significant effects on the likelihood
that claimants withdrew their claims or had their claims declared abandoned. Indeed, unrepresented claimants were 395.3 per cent more likely to have their claims
withdrawn or declared abandoned than claimants represented by lawyers. Similarly,
claimants represented by consultants were 26.8 per cent more likely to have their
claims withdrawn or declared abandoned than claimants represented by lawyers.
Moreover, in cases resulting in positive or negative decisions on the merits,
claimants represented by lawyers were 70.1 per cent more likely to succeed than
claimants represented by consultants and 275.0 per cent more likely to succeed than unrepresented claimants. However, in interpreting these differences
in grant rates it should be noted that the predicted grant rates based on yearly
country of origin averages were 40.5 per cent higher for claimants represented
by lawyers compared to claimants represented by consultants and 75.1 per cent
higher for claimants represented by lawyers relative to unrepresented claimants.
In other words, claimants from countries with lower than average grant rates
were disproportionately more likely to be represented by consultants or to be
unrepresented. Nonetheless, the predicted grant rates based on country of origin
averages for unrepresented claimants and for claimants represented by consultants
were respectively 17.9 per cent and 108.6 per cent higher than the actual grant
rates-meaning that unrepresented claimants and claimants represented by
consultants are much less successful than would be predicted based on yearly
country of origin averages.
2. COUNSEL TYPE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN YEARLY AVERAGES
Table 3 examines if the effect of counsel varies depending on whether claimants
come from countries of origin with above average or below average yearly grant
rates. As can be seen, regardless of whether claimants come from countries with
high, low, or average grant rates, in cases resulting in positive or negative decisions represented claimants are more likely to succeed than are unrepresented
claimants, and claimants represented by lawyers are more likely to succeed than
claimants represented by consultants. However, while counsel has effects across
the full range of yearly country of origin averages, these effects appear to be
more pronounced at the lower and middle ranges than at the higher range of
yearly country of origin averages. For example, claimants from countries with
low yearly grant rates (i.e., under 20 per cent) are 57.8 per cent more likely to
succeed when they are represented by lawyers than when they are represented by
consultants and are 343.8 per cent more likely to succeed than when they are
unrepresented. Claimants from countries with average grant rates (i.e., 40-60
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TABLE 3: REFUGEE CLAIM OUTCOMES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (COO), AVERAGE
YEARLY GRANT RATES, AND COUNSEL TYPE (2005-2009)COO
Average
Yearly
GrantRate

Decisions
Decisions

Grant
Rate

(%)

(%)

(%)

Predicted
Grant
Rate (%)b

Decisions

Decisions
(%)

Grant
Rate

(%)

Lawyer

Predicted
Grant
Rate (%)b

Consultant

0-19

6,122

12.6

14.2

12.1

1,036

21.8

9.0

11.9

20-39

6,638

13.6

34.3

29.9

1,640

34.4

21.9

29.2

40-59

12,516

25.7

50.9

49.4

1,121

23.5

41.7

47.6

60-79

15,160

31.1

71.4

70.5

626

13.1

60.4

70.9

80-100

8,310

17.0

89.8

89.6

339

7.1

87.9

89.2

Total

48,746

100

57.0

55.5

4,762

100.0

33.5

39.5

None

Other

0-19

995

37.1

3.2

11.3

206

17.5

3.9

12.0

20-39

922

34.4

10.7

28.9

200

17.0

24.0

28.9

14.7

25.9

48.5

206

17.5

37.4

49.9

251

9.4

37.5

69.7

212

18.1

73.6

71.6

120

.4.5

68.3

87.7

350

29.8

94.9

91.9

100.0

15.2

31.7

1,174

100.0

52.9

56.1

40-59

394

60-79
80-100
Total

-

2,682

'Excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved
bBased on yearly country of origin grant rates, excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved

per cent) do 22.1 per cent better when they are represented by lawyers than when
they are represented by consultants, and do 96.5 per cent better when they are
represented by lawyers than when they are unrepresented. Finally, claimants from
countries with high yearly grant rates (i.e., over 80 per cent), are 2.2 per cent and
31.5 per cent more likely to succeed when they are represented by lawyers than
when they are represented by consultants or are unrepresented, respectively. In
other words, representation matters, but it seems to matter more for claimants
from countries with low and average yearly grant rates than for claimants from
countries with high yearly grant rates.
3.

LAWYERS' EXPERIENCE

Table 4 considers the relation between success rates and a lawyer's experiencemeasured in terms of the number of claims for which a particular lawyer served as
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TABLE 4: REFUGEE CLAIM OUTCOMES BY LAWYER'S EXPERIENCE [2005-2009)'
Law-yes

Decisions

Decisions
(%

Abandoned/
Withdrawn
Rate

Grant Rate
%b

Predicted Grant
Rate (%)'

1

278

0.5

22.3

35.8

48.0

2-10

2,005

3.6

17.7

48.8

51.2

11-25

2,926

5.2

12.6

49.6

54.2

26-50

3,904

7.0

12.8

52.1

52.6

51-100

6,137

11.0

12.5

53.4

53.5

101-250

14,407

25.7

11.5

56.4

55.1

251+

26,372

47.1

12.9

60.6

57.1

Total

56,029

100.0

12.7

57.0

55.5

Experience
(number of cases
2005-2009)

Excluding cases where claimants were not represented by lawyers
b Excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved

c Based on yearly country of origin grant rates, excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved

counsel during the period of the study-in cases where claimants are represented
by lawyers.
Table 4 shows that there is a strong positive relation between grant rates and
lawyers' experience. For example, lawyers who represented only one claimant
during the period of the study had clients withdraw or have their claims declared
abandoned 72.9 per cent more frequently than lawyers who represented 251
or more claimants. Similarly, in cases resulting in positive or negative decisions, clients of lawyers who represented 251 or more claimants were 69.3
per cent more likely to be successful than clients of lawyers who represented
only one claimant. It should also be noted that these differences in success rates
are not simply a result of the countries of origin of claimants represented by
counsel with varying degrees of experience. Whereas clients of lawyers representing 251 or more claimants were 6.1 per cent more likely to be successful than
predicted based on yearly country of origin averages, the predicted grant rates
based on yearly country of origin averages for clients of lawyers representing only
one claimant were 34.1 per cent higher than their actual grant rates. Therefore,
it would appear that what matters at RPD hearings is not merely the ability of
claimants to secure lawyers to serve as counsel, but also the ability to secure lawyers
68
experienced in refugee law.
68.

While the relation between experience of consultants and outcomes is not as clear as the
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4. COUNSEL TYPE AND CLAIMANT GENDER
Table 5 breaks down the statistics regarding the relation between counsel and
outcomes from Table 2 by the gender of principal claimants.
As can be seen in Table 5, male principal claimants were 14.1 per cent more
likely to have their claims withdrawn or declared abandoned than female principal claimants. Moreover, in cases resulting in a positive or negative decision,
female principal claimants were 17 per cent more likely to succeed in their claims.
This difference in success rates cannot be attributed entirely to the claimant's
country of origin. Indeed, in cases resulting in positive or negative decisions,
TABLE 5: REFUGEE CLAIM OUTCOMES BY COUNSEL TYPE AND CLAIMANT
GENDER (2005-2009)1
Counsel Type

Decisions

Decisions (%)

Abandoned/
Withdrawn Rate
(%)

Grant Rate

Predicted Grant
Rate (%)'

Female Principal Claimants
Lawyer

20,939

80.9

12.1

61.7

55.4

Consultant

2,178

8.4

15.8

38.8

39.7

None

2,205

8.5

65.6

20.3

33.0

Other

569

2.2

13.9

62.0

60.1

Total

25,891

100.0

17.0

58.4

53.4

Male Principal Claimants
Lawyer

35,067

78.1

13.1

54.2

55.5

Consultant

3,529

7.9

16.2

30.2

39.5

None

5,416

12.1

61.8

13.5

31.2

Other

868

1.9

20.9

46.4

53.3

44,880

100.0

19.4

49.9

52.8

Total

Excluding 26 cases where principal claimant gender was unspecified
Excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved
c Based on yearly country of origin grant rates, excluding cases that are abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved

relation between experience of lawyers and outcomes, the overall trend is similar. For

example, during the period of the study, consultants who were involved in either only 1
case or 2-10 cases had success rates of 35.1 per cent (77 decisions) and 26.1 per cent (487

decisions), respectively. During the same period, consultants involved in either 101-250 or
more than 250 cases had success rates of 37.4 per cent (1024 decisions) and 49.1 per cent
(509 decisions), respectively.
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female principal claimants were 9.4 per cent more likely to succeed than would
be predicted based on yearly country of origin averages, whereas male principal
claimants had predicted grant rates based on yearly country of origin averages
that were 5.8 per cent higher than their actual grant rates.6 9
In addition to these variations in grant rates, Table 5 also reveals that female
claimants were 3.6 per cent more likely to be represented by lawyers and 6.3 per
cent more likely to be represented by consultants than male principal claimants.
At the same time, male principal claimants were 42.4 per cent more likely to be
unrepresented than their female counterparts.
5. UNCATEGORIZED COUNSEL
The study's findings with regard to uncategorized counsel are difficult to interpret.
That is because, as noted above in Part I(C), uncategorized counsel include
diverse types of counsel, ranging from paralegals at law firms, to community legal
workers at immigration law clinics, to friends and family of claimants, to persons
for whom no information could be obtained." Therefore, one should be cautious
about drawing conclusions regarding grant rates or abandon/withdraw rates of
such a mixed group of counsel.
Nonetheless, one interesting finding of the study with regard to uncategorized
counsel relates to a small number of uncategorized counsel who represented a very
large number of claimants over the period of the study. One in particular stands
out: Hagos Beiene. Beiene is neither a consultant nor a lawyer, but he is listed as
counsel in 376 cases from 2005 to 2009.1 Moreover, internet searches turned up
immigration consulting businesses with various names for which he is listed as
the proprietor or the contact person.72 Unfortunately, it was not possible to reach
anyone at any of the phone numbers listed, which means that the basis upon which
Beiene purported to serve as counsel in these cases could not be determined.73

69.
70.
71.

72.

73.

For a more detailed examination of the effect of gender on refugee claim outcomes, see
Rehaag, "Gender," supra note 66.
See text accompanying note 65.
Beiene had a very high success rate in these decisions: 97.2 per cent. While this high success
rate can partly be attributed to the countries of origin of the claimants he represented (Eritrea
and Ethiopia), it should nonetheless be noted that Beiene outperformed the yearly country of
origin average for the subset of claims he was involved with (89.4 per cent).
See e.g. "Hagos Paralegal Svc," online: Profile Canada <http://www.profilecanada.com/
companydetail.cfm?company=596056_HagosParalegal Svc_Toronto_ON>; "Hagos
Immigration & Paralegal," online: Business Net Pages <http://www.businessnetpages.com/
companypage.aspxlontario/toronto/hagos-immigration-and-paralegal/85 4 595/list>.
For further details on Beiene, see Part III(B)(2), below.
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While Beiene is something of an exceptional case, it is nonetheless significant
that information about dozens of individuals who served as counsel to claimants
during the five year period of the study, some of whom represented over ten
claimants each, could not be located. Moreover, names used by consultants,
either in the IRB's database or on websites associated with their consulting firms,
often did not match names listed in the CSIC database (e.g., given names were
listed differently, given names and family names were reversed, et cetera). In
addition, no qualifications could be confirmed in the directories of the relevant
professional bodies for several counsel who held themselves out to be either lawyers
or consultants in online sources.
6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In summary, the study found that counsel is a major factor affecting outcomes
in refugee determinations. Most claimants are represented by lawyers, but where
claimants are unrepresented or, to a lesser extent, are represented by consultants,
they are much more likely to have their cases withdrawn or declared abandoned
than when they are represented by lawyers. Similarly, in cases decided on the
merits, claimants represented by lawyers have a much greater likelihood of
obtaining refugee protection. Moreover, these variations in success rates cannot
be explained entirely by the countries of origin of claimants represented by
different types of counsel.
Just as importantly, the study found that the effect of counsel on outcomes
was similar in nature for claimants from countries with low, average, and high
yearly grant rates: In virtually all cohorts, claimants are better off represented than
unrepresented and are better off with lawyers than with consultants. However,
while the overall trend was similar across the full range of countries of origin,
representation seems to have a more significant impact on outcomes for claimants
from countries with low or average yearly grant rates compared to claimants from
countries with above average yearly grant rates.
In addition, the study found that where claimants are represented by lawyers, the level of experience of lawyers is an important factor in refugee claim
outcomes: Lawyers who represented significant numbers of claimants during
the period of the study had higher success rates than lawyers who represented
a smaller number of claimants, a finding that cannot be entirely attributed to
the countries of origin of clients represented by lawyers with varying levels of
experience.
The study also sought to examine whether claimant gender impacted upon
the ability of claimants to secure representation. On this issue, the study found
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that female principal claimants are more likely to be represented at the RPD than
male principal claimants, implying that female refugee claimants in Canada do
not appear to face disproportionate hurdles in accessing legal counsel.
Finally, as far as uncategorized counsel go, the study found that a small
number of counsel who are neither lawyers nor consultants represented many
claimants-in one case as many as 376 claimants over five years. No information
could be located about the basis on which these individuals purported to serve
as counsel (e.g., on a pro bono basis, as volunteers or staff of NGOs, et cetera).

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The key finding of the study is that access to competent and qualified counsel-and
especially to experienced lawyers-is a key determinant of outcomes in life and
death refugee determinations across the full range of countries of origin (i.e.,
countries with low, average, and high yearly grant rates).
This finding holds a number of implications. First, to the extent that some
claimants are not able to access competent and qualified counsel, the fairness of
the refugee determination process comes into question. To prevent such unfairness,
it is essential that claimants who cannot afford counsel obtain publicly funded
legal representation. Second, given the much lower success rates for claimants
represented by immigration consultants, it may be time to re-evaluate whether
immigration consultants are able to provide high quality representation. If not,
the role of immigration consultants in the refugee determination process may
need to be re-thought. "Third, regardless of what is done regarding authorized
immigration consultants, efforts must be made to ensure that unauthorized
counsel are not participating in the refugee determination process. Let us explore
each of these implications in turn.
A. PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS
As noted above in Part I(C), Canada's immigration legislation does not accord
refugee claimants the right to publicly funded legal representation. However,
several Canadian provinces do offer legal aid to some refugee claimants. Unfortunately, legal aid is far from universally available, including in the four provinces
where the vast majority of refugee claimants (99.1 per cent in 2009) reside:
Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta." Because the ability of refugee
74.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, CanadaFactsand Figures:Immigrant Overview:
Permanentand Temporary Residents: 2009, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
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claimants to access legal aid varies across provinces, it is worth examining each
of the four provinces that host the vast majority of refugee claimants in Canada.
1. ONTARIO
Ontario hosts the majority of refugee claimants in Canada (58.8 per cent in
2009).11 Currently, Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) coverage is available to.fund legal
representation at refugee hearings. This representation is, for the most part,
provided by lawyers who are members of the private bar selected by refugee
76
claimants who obtain LAO certificates.
To obtain LAO certificates, refugee claimants must first meet the prescribed financial eligibility requirements. 77 The test for financial eligibility is
complex and takes into account factors such as income, assets, debts, housing
costs, child care costs, and number of family members.78 The test for financial
eligibility is also very strict. For example, a single person with no assets or debts
and with a gross annual income over $11,000 is unlikely to qualify.79. Similarly
a family of three or more that has liquid assets in excess of $2,000 will likely
be ineligible.8"
Refugee claimants in Ontario who meet the financial eligibility requirements
must also meet other conditions to obtain legal aid. These conditions include not
having made previous refugee claims in Canada; not qualifying for permanent
residence through family class sponsorship; and not having family members who
are currently covered for legal aid for a refugee hearing."1
If these conditions are met, coverage will be determined based on the
following factors. First, where claimants come from countries that are included
on a "Country List" maintained by LAO, they will generally be provided
Government Services Canada, 2010) at 106 [CIC, Overview].

75. Ibid.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Department of Justice, An Analysis of Immigration and Refugee Law Services in Canada, (22
0
April 2005), online <http://www.justice.gc.caleng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2 03/rrO3lal 8-rrO3-aj 18/
rr03-l8.pdf> at 39-51 [DOJ, Analysis]. While most refugee claimants who obtain legal aid in
Ontario employ the services of private lawyers, some claimants use the services of community
legal clinics, as well as the Refugee Law Office (ibid at 42).
LegalAid Services Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 26, s 16.
See generally Legal Aid Ontario, FinancialEligibility Criteriafor Certificates:Policies and
ProceduresManual (June 2010).
Ibidat 46 (noting that the basic allowance for single persons is $427 per month and that the
maximum shelter allowance is $487 per month, which together amount to $10,968 per year).
Ibidat 12.
Legal Aid Ontario, Area Office Policy Manual: Chapter5: Ref gee and Immigration Law
Coverage (October 2009) at 5-3, 5-4.
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certificates to cover their refugee hearings.8 2 These listed countries typically have
extremely poor human rights records.83 Second, where claimants express fears of
listed types of persecution in specified countries, they will once again generally
be provided legal aid certificates to cover their refugee hearings.8" Listed types of
persecution cover groups known to be targeted for persecution (e.g., ethnic and
religious minorities, sexual minorities, and women facing domestic violence) in
countries that are otherwise regarded as generally compliant with human rights
norms. 85 Third, where claimants do not fall into either of these two previous
categories but meet the financial eligibility and other requirements, they will
generally be provided opinion certificates. Opinion certificates pay private bar
lawyers to prepare opinion letters assessing the merits of the claim and whether
coverage should be provided. LAO then reviews the opinion letters and provides
legal aid certificates only where, in its view, the refugee claim is meritorious.86
According to LAO's policy manual for immigration and refugee issues, "[m]erit
is established where the applicant can demonstrate a fear of persecutory treatment and where the country conditions support the applicant's subjective fear
of return."87
As Table 6 indicates, the number of applications for LAO certificates for
refugee hearings has increased steadily in recent years. Between 2006 and 2009,
the number of applications per year increased by 22.8 per cent. However,
during the same period, the number of claimants provided full hearing coverage
(with or without an opinion letter) increased by only 4.2 per cent. Similarly,
82.
83.

84.
85.

86.
87.

Ibid.
At the time of writing, the full list of countries included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Ivory
Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal,
Palestine, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Togo,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Ibid at Appendix 7.
Ibidat 5-3, 5-4.
At the time of writing, the full list of types of persecution included: Bulgaria: Roma, sexual
orientation, gender; Bangladesh: political (opposition to Bangladesh National Party),
Christian, Hindu; Former Yugoslavia: Roma; Grenada: sexual orientation; Guatemala:
sexual orientation; Jamaica: sexual orientation; Jordan: gender; Kuwait: stateless (Bedouin);
Lebanon: gender; Mexico: sexual orientation, gender; Nigeria: religion (non-Muslim), sexual
orientation, gender; Pakistan: domestic violence, sexual orientation, Ahmadi, Christian;
Romania: Roma; Russia: religion, sexual orientation, gender; St. Kitts: sexual orientation;
St. Lucia: sexual orientation; St. Vincent: sexual orientation; Trinidad & Tobago: sexual
orientation; Turkey: religion (Alevi), Kurdish. Ibid at Appendix 7.
Ibid at 5-3, 5-4.
Ibidat 5-2.
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TABLE 6: REFUGEE HEARING COVERAGE AT LEGAL AID ONTARIO
Full Hearing
Coverage
Refusal Rate
(%)

Refused
Wthut
Opinion

Full Hearing
Coverage
Without
Opinion

Opinion
Only

Opinion &
Full Heing
Covearg

Total

2006

247

5,518

732

2,210

8,707

11.2

2007

266

5,526

982

2,141

8,915

14.0

2008

315

6,217

1,402

2,424

10,358

16.6

r

2009

398

5,620

2,373

2,303

10,694

25.9

Total

1,226

22,881

5,489

9,078

38,674

17.4

SOURCE: Letter from Robert Ward, President/CEO, Legal Aid Ontario to Sean Rehaag (9 August 2010),
LAO Acess to Information Request # 10-008 (on file with author)

the refusal rate for full hearing coverage has increased every year from 2006 to
2009-more than doubling during this period. A growing number of refugee
claimants in Ontario, therefore, either have coverage refused outright or, more
frequently, obtain coverage only for the limited purposes of obtaining an opinion
letter, with hearing coverage refused on the grounds that claimants have not
established that their claims have merit. It is worth noting, moreover, that this
last group of claimants meets LAO's financial eligibility requirements-that is
to say, according to LAO's own tests, these individuals cannot afford privately
funded legal representation at their refugee hearings, but they are nonetheless
refused coverage. It is also worth noting that, as can be seen in Table 1, in Part
11(C), above, this period saw a 3.6 per cent increase in IRB refugee claim grant
rates. It would, therefore, appear that the decline in full hearing coverage at LAO
did not coincide with an overall decline in the proportion of well-founded claims
as determined by the IRB.
Two issues are worth noting with respect to these trends at LAO. First, an
increasing proportion of LAO's refugee funding is being used to pay lawyers
to prepare opinion letters, which does not provide refugee claimants with any
meaningful assistance. Inother words, significant resources are going into merit
screening procedures. Ideally, these resources should instead be allocated towards
providing actual legal assistance for refugee claimants.
Second, one possible interpretation of these trends is that LAO's screening
process is not, in fact, a merit screening process. That is to say, LAO may not
actually be applying the test that the policy manual specifies to determine whether
claims meet the specified threshold to qualify for legal aid (i.e., "where the
applicant can demonstrate a fear of persecutory treatment and where the country
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conditions support the applicant's subjective fear of return" 88). Rather, it is possible
that the screening process is being used to implement an informal quota system.
Support for this view can be found in the fact that despite both the significant
increase in the number of claimants seeking legal aid from 2006 to 2009 and the
modest increase in grant rates at the IRB during this period, the total number of
claimants provided with hearing coverage (both through the automatic coverage
procedures and through the opinion letter process) has remained remarkably
consistent. One might, therefore, contend that LAO is using merit screening to
meet targeted quotas for providing assistance to a certain number of claimants
by manipulating the country list, the types of persecution list, and the definition
of "merit." Of course, it should also be acknowledged that there are other
possible explanations for the trends. These explanations range from patterns
in the country of origin mix of applicants in Ontario to trends among lawyers
writing opinion letters to the increasingly unfriendly political environment
regarding refugees in Canada to simple random error (i.e., if you flip a coin
enough times, it is likely that at some point you will get tails twenty times in a
row). Moreover, it should also be acknowledged that even if LAO is using a quota
system rather than a merit threshold system, this is not necessarily unreasonable
given the reality of limited funding available to LAO. However, if this is the case,
there should be an open discussion about what types of claims are priorities for
legal aid funding and why.
2. QUEBEC
After Ontario, Quebec hosts the largest number of refugee claimants in Canada
(29.7 per cent in 2009).89 Refugee claimants residing in the province may be
eligible for legal aid through the Commission des services juridiques (CSJ),
typically in the form of funding legal representation for refugee hearings by lawyers
who are members of the private bar selected by claimants.9
To obtain legal aid in Quebec, refugee claimants must meet financial eligibility
requirements. Factors taken into account include number of family members,
income, liquid assets, property, and expenses such as child care, support
payments, and tuition.91 Currently, maximum annual income levels range from
$13,007 for single persons to $21,328 for families with two spouses and two
88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid.
CIC, Overview, supra note 74 at 106.
See generally DOJ, Analysis, supra note 76 at 51-56.
An Act respecting legai
aid and the provision ofcertain other legal
services,
RSQ 1996, c A- 14,
s4.1 [Legal aid act].
See also Regulation respecting legalaid,c A-14, r 0.2, ss 6-25.
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or more children, while maximum liquid assets range from $2,500 for single
persons to $5,000 for families. 2
Where claimants meet the CSJ financial eligibility requirements, they
are eligible for legal aid in administrative proceedings involving "matter[s that
threaten] or will in all likelihood threaten a person's physical or mental safety,
livelihood or ability to provide for his essential needs or those of his family"93 or
where "freedom of the person to whom legal aid would be granted is or is likely to
be seriously restricted."" Because refugee determinations involve such matters,9"
legal aid for refugee hearings is generally available.
TABLE 7: REFUGEE HEARING COVERAGE AT THE COMMISSION DES SERVICES

JURIDIQUES (QC)
Refused

Granted

Total

Hearing Coverage
Refusal Rate (%)

2006-2007

82

3,701

3,784

2.2

2007-2008

127

5,688

5,815

2.2

2008-2009

139

5,899

6,038

2.3

2009-2010

298

5,052

5,350

5.6

Total

647

20,340

20,987

3.1

Year

SOURCE: Letter from Yves Carrire, Secritaire de laCommission, Commission des services juridiques to
Sean Rehaag (26 October 2010) (on file with author).

Unlike in Ontario, CSJ has no systematic screening process for merit when
considering applications for refugee claim hearing coverage. Still, in principle, at
any stage in proceedings, legal aid may be refused or withdrawn where "the
applicant cannot establish the probable existence of his right" or where "the case
or remedy clearly has very little chance of succeeding."96 In practice, however,
refusal on these grounds appears rare. Indeed, as Table 7 indicates, the refusal rate
for refugee hearing coverage from fiscal year 2006-2007 to fiscal year 2009-2010
is only 3.1 per cent, a figure far below Ontario's refusal rate of 17.4 per cent
during approximately the same period.97 Moreover, the Quebec figures are not
financial versus merit), so even these
broken down by reason for refusal (e.g.,
Ibid, s 18.
Legal aidact, supra note 91, s4.7(9).
Ibid, s4.7(8).
See e.g. Singh, supra note 1 (holding that refugee determinations engage a claimant's right to
life, liberty, and the security of the person).
4
96. Legal aid act,supra note 91, s .11.
92.
93.
94.
95.

97. See Table 6, in Part III(A)(1), above.
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small numbers of refusals may be due to financial or other eligibility requirements
rather than due to considerations of merit.
Still, despite the comparatively low refusal rates in Quebec, it is worth noting
one troubling trend evident in Table 7: Refusal rates in refugee claim hearing
coverage at the CSJ appear to be increasing, with the most recent financial year
showing more than double the refusal rates of previous years.
3.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

British Columbia hosts a much smaller proportion of claimants (5.4 per cent in
2009) than either Ontario or Quebec. 8 Refugee claimants in British Columbia
may be eligible for legal aid coverage for their refugee hearings through the Legal
Services Society (LSS). As with Ontario and Quebec, the most common form for
99
such coverage is funding for representation by private lawyers.
Financial eligibility requirements for legal aid as currently set by the LSS
include net household annual income maximums of $17,040 for single persons
or $37,200 for families of four, with maximum personal property of $2,000 for
single persons or $5,000 for families of four."" Historically, refugee claimants in
British Columbia who met the financial eligibility requirements were entitled
to coverage for legal assistance with their refugee hearings without having to go
through a merit screening process."8 1 However, funding for the LSS was cut
severely in 2002, which prompted the LSS to implement merit screening
processes to reduce its refugee caseload. 2
The terms of the memorandum of understanding between the LSS and the
Attorney General of British Columbia that was in effect at the time of writing
explicidy authorize the LSS to use merit screening in determining which refugee
claimants obtain legal aid: "[The LSS] will provide representation by a lawyer to
eligible individuals in respect of ...
proceedings before the Refugee Protection
Division, as the [LSS] deems appropriate, having regard to merit and other
relevant factors.""1 3 Currently the LSS funds legal representation to assist with
98. CIC, Overview, supra note 74 at 106.
99. See generally DOJ, Analysis, supra note 76 at 15-22.
100. For the current financial eligibility requirements, see Legal Services Society, "Legal Aid Facts:
Financial Eligibility" (April 2010), online: < http://www.lss.bc.calassets/media/factSheets/
Financialeligibility.pdf>
101. See generally DOJ, Analysis, supra note 76 at 17.
102. For a discussion of the massive extent of the cuts, and the consequences to service delivery,
see Legal Services Society, "Annual Service Plan Report: 2002/2003" (2003), online: <http://
www.lss.bc.calassets/aboutUs/reports/ annualReports/annualServicePlanReport_2002.pdf>.
103. Memorandum of Understanding between the Attorney General and the Legal Services
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TABLE 8: REFUGEE HEARING COVERAGE AT THE LEGAL SERVICES SOCIETY (BC)

year

Refutsed

Granted

Total

Hearing Coverage
Refusal Rate (%)

81

870

951

2007-2008

135

1,077

1,212

11.1

2008-2009

400

1,372

1,772

22.6

2009-2010

564

1,017

1,581

35.7

Total

1,180

4,336

5,516

21.4

2006-2007

8.5

SOURCE: Letter from Gen Handley, Communications Assistant, Legal Services Society to Sean Rehaag (9
November 2010) LSS Request for Information File # 200912010:014 (on file with author).

refugee hearings where claimants have "a reasonable chance to succeed.""'4 However,
what counts as a reasonable chance of success appears to hinge largely on the
financial resources available to the LSS. In 2009, for example, the LSS announced
that it was "introducing stricter merit screening of immigration legal aid applications to ensure that spending remains within the available budget. This means
that some cases that would have been covered in the past will not be covered after
April 1, 2009."1° 1
Given this variability in what constitutes "merit," it is perhaps not surprising that, as Table 8 indicates, the refusal rate in applications for legal aid
for refugee hearing coverage has increased significantly in recent years. Indeed,
from fiscal year 2006-2007 to fiscal year 2009-2010, the refusal rate has more
than quadrupled.
4.

ALBERTA

Alberta hosts almost as many refugee claimants as British Columbia (5.2 per cent
in 2009) and significantly more than any of the remaining provinces. t 6 Limited
legal aid is available to assist refugee claimants in Alberta through Legal Aid
Alberta (LAA). Historically, most legal aid services in Alberta were provided to refugee claimants on a certificate basis by private lawyers." 7 However, representation is

Society (13 September 2005), s 8.1.
104. Legal Services Society, "Legal Aid Facts: Immigration Law Services" (April 2010), online:
<http://www.lss.bc.ca/ assets/media/factSheets/Immigration law services.pdf> at 1.
105. Legal Services Society, "Backgrounder: Service and operational changes at the Legal Services
Society" (25 February 2009), online: <http://www.lss.bc.ca/assets/media/newsReleases/
backgrounderServiceStaff ChangesFeb25.pdf> at 3.
106. CIC, Overview, supra note 74 at 106.
107. DOJ, Analysis, supra note 76 at 26-27.

REHAAG, ROLE OF COUNSEL

101

now provided largely through a mix of specialized staff at Legal Services Centres
run by LAA (who assist with the early stages of the claim and frequently serve as
counsel for refugee hearings) and member of the private bar (who generally serve
as counsel only at the hearing and only where staff are unavailable)."'
'The test for financial eligibility for legal aid in Alberta has recently become
more stringent. Prior to 6 April 2010, single individuals generally met the financial
eligibility requirement where their net annual income was below $21,000, while
the similar figure for a family of four was $40,000."9 As of 6 April 2010, however,
the test has changed such that single individuals must have a net annual income
of less than $14,700 and families of four must have a net annual income of less
than $30,096. 115In other words, the maximum annual net income has been cut
approximately 30 per cent.
Where refugee claimants meet financial eligibility criteria, they must still meet
substantive conditions to obtain LAA funded counsel to represent them at hearings.
As of 6 April 2010, these substantive conditions have become more restrictive as
well. " 1 The reason for the restrictions is that LAA must reduce its caseload because it
has capped annual expenditures on immigration and refugee matters to the amount
that is transferred for such purposes from the federal government-effectively cutting
the total amount spent on immigration and refugee matters by LAA almost in half.112
The first substantive condition is that representation for refugee hearings is
only available where, in the view of IAA, it is reasonable for the matter to proceed,
which means, among other things, that the case will be likely to succeed and that
the importance of the case justifies the cost of legal representation.' 13 While this
substantive condition has been in place for some time, LAA has announced that
108. Legal Aid Alberta, "Restructuring Immigration & Refugee Service Delivery" (March 2010) at
2 [LAA, "Restructuring"].
109. Legal Aid Alberta, "2010 Annual Report" (26 May 2010), online: <http://www.legalaid.
ab.ca/about/Documents/LAA%202010 /2oAnnual/2OReport.pdf> at 21.
110. Legal Aid Alberta, "2011 Annual Report" (31 May 2011), online: <http://www.legalaid.
ab.cajmedia/Documents/AR.2011-%20FINAL%20VERSION%20w/o20Cover.pdf> at 29.
111. LAA, "Restructuring," supra note 108 at 1-3.
112. Ibidat 1.
113. Ibid at 2. See also Legal Aid Alberta, "Legal Aid Society Rules" (1 April 2004), online:
<http://www.legalaid. ab.ca/lawyers/Documents/LASARules2004.pdf>, s 36:
a
The Legal Aid Society may provide legal services ...
in respect of any civil matter where ...
and ...
in the
reasonable person of modest means would commence or defend the action ...
opinion of the Legal Aid Society (a) the legal cost ...
is reasonable when compared to the relief
and (c) where circumstances ...
sought ...
(b) the matter has merit or a likelihood of success ...
warrant coverage.
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TABLE 9: REFUGEE HEARING COVERAGE AT LEGAL AID ALBERTA
Total

Hearing Coverage

Year

Refused

Granted

2006

51

277

328

15.5

2007

53

314

367

14.4

2008

122

628

750

16.3

Refusal Rate (%)

2009

94

671

765

12.3

Total

320

1,890

2,210

14.5

SOURCE: Letter from Katherhine Weaver, Vice President, Policy, Research, and Stakeholder Relations to
Sean Rehaag (13 December 2010) (on file with author).

as of 6 April 2010 it plans to apply the test more strictly: "A tougher screening
policy [will] be implemented, identifying those countries from which successful
' 114
claims are more likely."
The second substantive condition is that representation for refugee hearings
is not available where clients are able to self-represent. LAA acknowledges that
most refugee claimants are not in a position to reasonably self-represent. 15
However, LAA nonetheless notes that with respect to this part of the test, as of
6 April 2010, "hearing representation will not be the default service mode." 116
As Table 9 indicates, from 2006 to 2009, certificate refusal rates for refugee
matters did not change significantly, despite a large increase in the number of applications. However, two points are worth noting regarding refusal rates in Alberta.
First, the refusal rates do not actually reflect the number of claimants who
sought legal aid for their refugee hearings but were denied LAA certificates. That
is because there is an informal financial eligibility and merit screening process
at LAA before applications for certificates are made. Katherine Weaver, Vice
President, Policy, Research, and Stakeholder Relations at LAA describes this
screening process as follows:
From April 2003 to March 2010, Legal Aid Albertas Immigration Services Program
... provided the initial intake services for all immigration and refugee clients in the
Calgary Region. During the intake process, they would attempt to weed out those
clients whose potential refugee claims had no merit to proceed, thereby reducing
the number of applications for and refusals of certificates. ... There would also have
been situations where it was clear that potential refugee claimants would not meet
1 17
financial eligibility guidelines.
114. LAA, "Restructuring," supra note 108 at 2.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Email from Katherine Weaver, Vice President, Policy, Research, and Stakeholder Relations to
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In other words, informal pre-application screening processes resulted in claimants being effectively denied LAA certificates for refugee hearings at rates that are
not captured by the statistics in Table 9.
The second point to note is that due to the substantial cuts to LAA's expenditures on refugee coverage that came into effect in 2010, the number of refugee
claimants who will be unable to access LAA certificates-whether due to formal
or informal screening processes-will surely increase.
5. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE OVERVIEW OF MAJOR LEGAL AID
PROGRAMS
A clear trend is evident in this review of legal aid coverage available for refugee
claimants in the four provinces where the vast majority of refugee claimants in
Canada reside. Financial eligibility tests are extremely restrictive and in some
cases are becoming increasingly so. Moreover, even where refugee claimants
demonstrate that they cannot afford counsel according to these strict tests, they
may nonetheless be denied legal aid coverage on the basis of what purports to
be merit screening. The precise tests and procedures for determining what
constitutes merit vary across provinces. However, it would appear that legal aid
programs may not in fact be applying true merit tests where claims that meet
a certain evidentiary threshold in terms of risk of persecution obtain funding.
Rather, merit screening seems to be used in many cases as a kind of quota system,
whereby the standard of merit shifts depending on the level of resources that
provincial legal aid programs are prepared to put into immigration and refugee
matters. Indeed, the overall trend is that several provinces are adopting increasingly
restrictive standards of merit in order to reduce refugee law expenditures.
This pattern is deeply troubling in light of the major finding of the present
study, namely that representation is a key driver of outcomes in refugee determinations. As noted at the beginning of this article, because of the life and death
stakes involved, the refugee determination process must comply with the principles
of fundamental justice as a matter of constitutional law. If, as the study has
shown, access to qualified and competent lawyers is a major factor in claimants
successfully navigating the refugee determination process, then the legal aid merit
screening processes for refugee claimants who cannot afford counsel must in turn
comply with the principles of fundamental justice. To the extent that the standard
of merit shifts depending on the financial priorities of legal aid programs, existing
merit screening processes likely breach these principles. Moreover, even if the

Sean Rehaag (1 December 2010) (on file with author).
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standard of merit was fixed at a reasonable level, the processes for determining
whether claimants meet this standard would themselves need to be procedurally
robust, with sufficient safeguards to catch errors. The problem, of course, is that
establishing such procedurally robust processes requires substantial resourcesresources which would be better put into providing legal assistance to claimants,
rather than into administering screening processes.
Another worrisome pattern in light of the present study is the increasing
reliance on country of origin in determining whether claims have merit for the
purposes of legal aid eligibility. Country of origin may be an attractive criterion
for legal aid programs because it can be applied consistently without needing
to go through time-consuming and expensive assessments of the substance of
refugee claims. However, as this study establishes, qualified and competent representation matters across the full range of countries-and, indeed, representation
appears to have stronger impacts on claimants from countries with low yearly
grant rates than on claimants from countries with high yearly grant rates. To put
the matter bluntly, this study suggests that legal aid policies that screen out claimants
from countries with low yearly grant rates put the lives of refugees (i.e., those who
do in fact meet the refugee definition) from those countries at risk in order to
save the expense of paying either for robust merit screening processes or for.legal
representation for claimants who do not meet the refugee definition.
If it is not acceptable to use country of origin as a replacement for substantive
merit screening processes, and if substantive merit screening processes cannot be
sufficiently procedurally robust without unduly diverting resources from providing
legal assistance to refugees, then what should be done? This question becomes all
the more pressing in light of the impending revisions to the refugee determination
process. As noted in Part I(B), above, these revisions dramatically expedite the
refugee determination process, making the timelines for substantive merit screening more challenging. Moreover, the revisions also implement a new appeal,
which will increase demand on legal aid programs for refugee matters.1 18
In my view, in light of the findings of this study and of the impending
reforms to the refugee determination system, the only appropriate course of
action is for the federal government to transfer adequate funds to provincial legal
aid programs in order for them to provide legal aid for all refugee claimants who
meet reasonable financial eligibility requirements. Absent such adequate funding,
only those who can afford counsel-or who are lucky enough to get through
118. For discussions of the impact of the impending reforms on the ability of refugee claimants to
secure counsel, see generally David Maras, "Balancing" (2010) 88 Imm LR (3d) 212; Erin C
Roth, "Is the Proposed BalancedRefugee Reform Act Balanced?" (2010) 86 Imm LR (3d) 168.
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arbitrary and increasingly restrictive "merit" screening processes-will be able to
fully access a fair refugee determination system.
B. NON-LAWYER REPRESENTATIVES
In addition to the challenges posed by the failure of Canadas immigration legislation to
guarantee publicly funded legal representation for refugee claimants who cannot afford
counsel, the legislation poses further challenges by virtue of allowing claimants to
'
Two.
be represented at their hearings by "a barrister or solicitor or other counsel."119
types of "other counsel" are authorized to represent refugee claimants before the
IRB: immigration consultants and pro bono representatives. Both have proven
controversial, and the present study offers further reasons to be concerned about
the role of such counsel in the refugee determination process.
1.

IMMIGRATION CONSULTANTS

T-he regulation of the legal profession-and the monopoly on the provision
of legal services accorded to members of the legal profession-is a matter that
generally falls within provincial jurisdiction in Canada.12 However, federal
immigration legislation has long authorized counsel other than barristers and
solicitors to represent persons before the IRB.' 2 '
In the 2001 decision Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat,22 the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of federal legislation
authorizing representation at the IRB by counsel other than members of
provincial law societies. 12 3 Specifically, the Court held that it was open to the
federal government to determine who could serve as counsel at the IRB because
the operation of this tribunal falls within the federal government's jurisdiction
over aliens and naturalization. 124 Moreover, to the extent that the federal
legislation conflicted with provincial legislation restricting the provision of legal
services to qualified members of the legal profession, the Court held that federal

119. IRPA, supra note 4, s 167 [emphasis added].
120. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II,No 5, s
92(13) (according jurisdiction over property and civil rights to the provinces), s 92(14)
(according jurisdiction over the administration of justice to the provinces). See also e.g. Law
Society Act,RSO 1990, c L.8, s 26.1 (limiting the practice of law and the provision of legal
services in Ontario to licencees of the Law Society of Upper Canada).
ImmigrationAct, RSC 1985, c 1-2 (repealed), s 69.1; IRPA, supra note 4, s 167.
121. See e.g.
122. [2001] 3 SCR 113.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid at paras 33-37.
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legislation prevailed by virtue of the paramountcy doctrine. 125 In coming to this
holding, Justice Gonthier, writing for the Court, also noted that
[n]on-lawyers may provide a very useful service to people who are subject to IRB
proceedings. It may be difficult to find lawyers who are fluent in other languages, as
well as familiar with different cultures. The provisions of the Immigration Act itself
call for proceedings to be as informal and expeditious as the circumstances and fairness permit... . The possibility to choose to be 26represented by a non-lawyer may be
1
conducive to informality and expeditiousness.

Shortly after this decision, the federal government created the Advisory
Committee on Regulating Immigration Consultants (Advisory Committee) to
report on the conditions under which non-lawyer counsel should continue to be
authorized to represent persons in proceedings before the IRB. 127 As noted by the
Advisory Committee,
Over the years various attempts have been made to address the problem of how, and
by whom, Immigration Consultants should be regulated. Until now, these efforts
have been unsuccessful. This has led to a situation where there are no set standards
for the levels of education, the quality of services, or the accountability necessary to
offer one's services as an immigration consultant.
The fact that certain consultants have abused the trust that their clients have placed
128
8
in them has been detrimental to the profession as a whole.

In 2003, the Advisory Committee issued its recommendations, which
included limiting paid representation at the IRB to lawyers and licensed immigration consultants; allowing representation at the IRB by other persons who do
not charge fees; and creating a self-regulatory body for the regulation and licensing
29
of immigration consultants. 1
The following year, the federal government followed up on these recommendations by amending .the regulations accompanying Canada's immigration
legislation. The relevant portions of the. regulations read:
2 ... "authorized representative" means a member in good standing of a bar of a
province, the Chambre des notaires du*Quebec or the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants...

125. Ibid at paras 51-74.
126. Ibid at para 60 [citations omitted].
127. Report of the Advisory Committee on Regulating Immigration Consultants (Ottawa: Minister of
Public Works and Government Services, 2003).
128. Ibid at 5.
129. Ibid at1-2.
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13.1 ...
no person who is not an authorized representative may, for a fee, represent,
advise or consult with a person who is the subject of a proceeding or application
13
before the Minister, an officer or the Board.

The CSIC (Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants) then established
rules to determine who could become members, which include the following
requirements: (1) Graduating from an accredited program of study (approximately 4 months) for immigration consultants offered by a number of
community colleges; (2) Completing a pre-admission course offered by CSIC;
(3) Passing a language proficiency test; (4) Passing a full membership exam; (5)
Demonstrating good character (i.e., no criminal record, no recent bankruptcy,
etc.); and (6) Obtaining errors and omission insurance."' Moreover, to continue
to practice as immigration consultants, CSIC members are required to keep their
membership in good standing, which requires maintaining errors and omissions
insurance and abiding by the CSIC Rules ofProfessionalConduct.'32

130. IRPA Regulations, supra note 44, ss2, 13.1, as amended by Regulations Amending the
Immigrationand Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2004-59. It is worth noting that the
federal government's decision to establish a self-regulating immigration consulting industry
was subject to further constitutional litigation. Law Society of Upper Canada v Canada
(Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration) (2008), [2009] 2 FCR 466 (CA), leave to appeal to
SCC refused, [2008] SCCA No 403 (QL). In upholding the constitutionality of regulations
authorizing CSIC members to represent applicants before the IRB, the Federal Court of
Appeal noted (ibidat paras 4-6) [citations omitted]:
No administrative scheme in Canada has a more profound impact upon the lives of individuals
than that governing immigration and the determination of refugee status. In order to increase
access to the process, it is acknowledged that lawyers should not enjoy a monopoly in advising and representing individuals before administrative decision makers in immigration and
refugee matters.
Although legal aid is available in some proceedings, immigration consultants have a valuable
role to play in assisting individuals of limited means to negotiate this complex legal and
administrative scheme. Further, the fact that a consultant is of the same ethnic background as
the client, and can communicate with the client in her own language, can be both reassuring
to the individual caught up in the immigration system, and helpful to the decision maker.
However, it isalso recognized that consultants too often have been incompetent and have preyed
unscrupulouslyuponclients. Some formofregulationhaslongbeen thoughtessential toprotectthe
vulnerable, to assist decision makers, and to maintain confidence in Canada's immigration system.
131. Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants, "CSIC Membership," online: <https://www.
csic-scci.ca/con'tent/how to become_a_member>.
132. Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants, "Rules of Professional Conduct," online:
<https://www.csic-scci.ca/content/professional-conduct>.
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Unfortunately, while the CSIC was established to address some of the earlier
criticisms levelled against unregulated immigration consultants, there remain
grave concerns about the industry. A 2008 report of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, for example, indicates that
"[d]espite the establishment of CSIC, complaints from the public and from
within the profession about unacceptable practices by immigration consultants
have continued."' 33 Similarly the report notes that there are "various ways in
11 4
which rogue immigration consultants avoid federal regulation.
In response to these concerns, the Minister tabled the Cracking Down on
Crooked ConsultantsAct in Parliament in June 2010.11 At the time of writing,
the bill (with a less provocative title) has received royal assent, but its provisions
have not yet come into force.' 36 Among other things, the bill seeks to authorize
the government to share information with regulatory bodies for the purposes
of disciplinary proceedings for violations of rules of professional conduct.'
According to the Minister, the bill was tabled due to concerns that
-[c]rooked immigration consultants victimize people who dream of immigrating
to Canada... . Worse still, there is evidence that these individuals encourage prospective immigrants to lie on their immigration applications, to concoct bogus stories
about persecution when making refugee claims, or to enter into sham marriages with
Canadian citizens and permanent residents. This undermines the integrity and fair38
ness of Canadas immigration system.1

At the same time as the bill was tabled, the Minister issued a notice'39 that
the government intends to identify a new governing body for immigration consultants to "address a lack of public confidence in the regulation of immigration
consultants." 14 It would appear, then, that the government's efforts to establish
133. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and immigration, Regulating
Immigration Consultants (June 2008) at 1 (Chair: Norman Doyle).
134. Ibid at 5.
135. Bill C-35, CrackingDown on Crooked Consultants Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (first reading
8 June 2010) [Crooked Consultants 1].
136. An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct, SC 2011, c 8 (assented to 23
March 2011, not yet in force) [Crooked ConsultantsI1].
137. Ibid, s 4 . See also Crooked Consultants I,supra note 135, cl5.
138. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Minister Kenney introduces legislation
to crack down on crooked immigration consultants" (8 June 2010) online: <http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/department/media/ releases/2010/2010-06-08.asp> [emphasis added] [Kenney,
"Crooked Consultants"].
139. Notice requesting comments on a proposal to establish a public selection process with the
objective of identifying a governing body for recognition as the regulator of immigration
consultants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), (2010) C Gaz I, 1502.
140. Kenney, "Crooked Consultants," supra note 138.
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a functioning self-regulating profession of immigration consultants have not yet
been successful and that unprofessional practices by licensed consultants
continue to pose serious problems.
The present study provides further reasons to be concerned about immigration consultants. Specifically, clients of consultants are much more likely to
withdraw or have their refugee claims declared abandoned than are clients of
lawyers. Moreover, immigration consultants have significantly lower refugee
claim success rates than lawyers, and these lower rates are not fully attributable to
the countries of origin of their respective clients.
There are two ways to interpret these differences between immigration
consultants and lawyers. First, it may be that consultants are more likely than
lawyers to bring forward unfounded claims. One possible explanation is that
lawyers may be more skilled at estimating whether a claim is likely to succeed,
and as a result they may be more likely to properly advise clients to pursue other
immigration options instead of making futile refugee claims. Another possible
reason is that individuals who know that they are not likely to obtain refugee
status but who wish to make claims for other reasons (such as delaying removal
for several months) may be more likely to employ consultants than lawyers. This
might make sense given that such claimants would not be concerned about the
quality of representation and would likely want to minimize the cost of representation. Or perhaps claimants with weak claims are more likely to seek the services
of immigration consultants simply because they were unable to obtain legal aid
to pay for lawyers due to the merit screening processes used by some legal aid
programs (though this would not account for why claimants who come from
countries for which legal aid is generally available-i.e., countries with very high
grant rates-are more successful with lawyers than with consultants). Regardless of the
reason, if consultants bring forward unfounded refugee claims more frequently
than lawyers, this would presumably be of some concern to the current Conservative federal government, which never misses an occasion to decry so-called
"bogus" refugee claims." 1
Second, it may be that consultants are not, in fact, more likely than lawyers
to bring forward unfounded refugee claims, but rather that they are less likely to

141. See e.g. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason
Kenney, PC., M.P Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Cracking
Down on Crooked Consultants" (8 June 2010) online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
department/media/speeches/2010/2010-06-08.asp> ("there have been many reports of
crooked immigration consultants coaching people to make bogus refugee claims, one of the
reasons for our broken asylum system") [Kenney, "Cracking Down"].
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fully pursue those claims and less likely to succeed with those claims irrespective
of their merits. On this reading, some claimants who meet the refugee definition
may not be recognized as such because of the errors or omissions of immigration
consultants-and had these claimants been represented by lawyers instead of
consultants, they would have been more likely to obtain refugee protection. An
alternative reading of the same phenomenon would be that some lawyers manipulate the refugee determination process and that individuals who do not meet
the refugee definition are nonetheless able to obtain refugee protection when
they are represented by skilled lawyers. And indeed, this view arguably informs
some recent government policies that seek to minimize the role of lawyers in the
refugee determination process. 1 2 However, it must be borne in mind that, as
noted at the outset of this article, refugees must be provided with access to a fair
and procedurally robust refugee determination process as a matter of Canadian
constitutional law. That is because where claimants meet the refugee definition
but are not recognized as such due to flaws in the refugee determination process,
the likely result is that the claimants in question will be deported to countries
where they may face persecution, torture, or even death-thereby putting at risk
their rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. Some may be of the view
that it would be more expedient if refugee claimants were not represented,
because fewer claimants would be accorded refugee protection. However, if, in
fact, outcomes in the refugee determination process hinge not on the merits of
the claim but instead on whether claimants are able to obtain legal representation
(and if publicly funded legal representation is not available to all those who
cannot afford lawyers), then the refugee determination process is neither fair nor
procedurally robust.
Regardless of which of these explanations-or combination of themis accurate, the difference in outcomes demonstrated in this study points to
the need to reconsider the role of immigration consultants in the refugee
determination process. In my view, professional and competent immigration
consultants can, in principle, participate helpfully in the refugee determination
142. Consider, for example, reverse order questioning at refugee hearings, whereby rather than
beginning refugee hearings by allowing counsel to ask questions of claimants to present their
stories, IRB members (or Refugee Protection Officers) instead begin by asking questions
about problematic aspects of the claim. Immigration and Refugee Board, Guideline 7
ConcerningPreparationand Conductof a Hearingin the Refugee ProtectionDivision (effective
1 December 2003) s 3.2. Or consider that the revised refugee determination process replaces
the refugee claimant's written narrative, currently prepared by counsel, with a transcript of an
interview of the claimant by a civil servant. See text accompanying note 36.
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process, increasing access to representation at the IRB by claimants who might
not otherwise be able to afford counsel. And indeed, there are many examples
of extremely well qualified and conscientious immigration consultants who have
long provided excellent representation before the RPD. However, the present
study raises concerns regarding the quality of representation currently provided
by immigration consultants overall. At the same time, as noted, the immigration
consulting industry has lost the confidence of the public, and even in the best
case scenario it will take time to regain that confidence. Moreover, during the
transition to the reformed refugee determination process over the next several
years, competent representation at the IRB will be more important than ever,
especially considering that a new cohort of civil servants will be making first
instance refugee determinations, few of whom will be lawyers and most of
whom will not have prior experience in refugee law. Taken together, in my
view, immigration consultants should not currently be offering unsupervised
representation in life and death refugee claims, particularly at a time when
the refugee determination system is undergoing a major overhaul. Rather,
until such time as the immigration consultant industry establishes a successful
track record of ensuring that consultants provide professional and quality
representation (a period of time to be measured in years, not months), the
role of immigration consultants in the refugee determination process should
be limited to scenarios where they are supervised by lawyers.
I acknowledge that some might feel that such a proposal goes too far. After
all, this study demonstrates that although claimants succeed more often when
they are represented by lawyers rather than consultants, they are nonetheless
significantly better off with consultants than unrepresented. As a result, some
might argue for a transitional program, whereby until such time as legal aid
programs across Canada ensure that all refugee claimants can obtain representation by lawyers, immigration consultants should be allowed to continue
participating in the refugee determination process unsupervised.
In my view, however, this would be the wrong approach given both the
extremely serious consequences of errors in refugee adjudication and the upcoming
changes to the refugee determination process. A preferable approach would be
for the government to first adequately fund legal aid to provide competent and
qualified representation for refugee claimants. Only then should it reconsider
whether the immigration consulting industry has established a sufficient track
record of ensuring competence and professionalism such that consultants should
be allowed to provide unsupervised representation for refugees (possibly funded
through legal aid). In the meantime, consultants could continue to participate in
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the refugee determination process-thereby decreasing the cost of representationbut only under the supervision of a lawyer.
2. PRO BONO REPRESENTATIVES
As noted above in Part I(C), the regulations accompanying Canada's current
immigration legislation restrict paid counsel in immigration matters to lawyers
and immigration consultants. However, there is no similar restriction on unpaid
representatives." 3
Given the increasing restrictions on legal aid, the decision to allow individuals to
be represented by non-lawyers and non-immigration consultants on a pro bono
basis is understandable: Some assistance-even if not provided by lawyers or
immigration consultants-may be better than nothing. Moreover, some NGOs
offer high quality assistance with immigration and refugee applications without
necessarily having lawyers or immigration consultants perform all these services
directly. 14" Similarly, some immigration law clinics employ paralegals and com1 45
munity legal workers to assist with immigration and/or refugee applications.
While there are good reasons to continue to allow this practice, the rule
exempting pro bono representatives from the requirement that counsel in
immigration and refugee matters must be lawyers or immigration consultants is
vulnerable to abuse. In particular, it is difficult to ensure that non-lawyers and
non-immigration consultants that purport to offer pro bono representation are
doing so free of charge. In fact, there is evidence that at least some unauthorized
representatives are likely charging fees in contravention of the regulations.
In 2008, the IRB developed a policy for dealing with unauthorized paid
representatives.14 6 This policy allows the IRB to review the files of persons
suspected of being unauthorized paid representatives, to hold a hearing to
determine whether these suspicions are well-founded, and, if they prove wellfounded, to prohibit the person concerned from serving as a representative in
47
further IRB proceedings.1

143. IRPA Regulations, supra note 44, s 13.1.
144. Examples of highly regarded NGOs that use volunteers to assist with immigration and/or
refugee applications include the FCJ Refugee Centre and the Halifax Refugee Clinic.
145. DOJ, Analysis, supra note 76 at 5; DOJ, Representation, supranote 11 at 5.
146. Immigration and Refugee Board, Policyfor HandlingIRB ComplaintsRegarding Unauthorized
Paid Representatives (28 March 2008), online: <http://www.irb.gc.ca/Eng/brdcom/references/

pol/pol/ Pages/paid-remun.aspx>.
147. Ibid, s 5.6.
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This process has recently been followed in the Beiene Decision.4 8 According
to the IRB, between 2004 and 2010, Hagos Beiene represented over four hundred
applicants in IRB proceedings, mostly in refugee determinations. During this
period, Mr. Beiene was neither a qualified lawyer nor a licensed immigration
consultant. According to internet records, Mr. Beiene maintained two businesses:
Hagos Paralegal Services and Hagos Immigration and Paralegal Services. Also, he
was widely known in the refugee advocacy community-and by IRB staff-for
meeting with clients and conducting other business meetings near the reception
area of the IRB's Toronto office." 9 Because of the large number of cases for which
Mr. Beiene served as a representative, and due to concerns regarding his unusual
business practices, the IRB reviewed his files. Following this review, Mr. Beiene
was asked to provide evidence-in the form of income tax and other business
records-that he was not charging fees. However, Mr. Beiene declined to respond
to this request. He also declined to respond to repeated requests to inform the
IRB as to whether he wished to participate in an oral hearing to make representations
in response to the allegations made against him. 5 '
On 15 May 2010, the IRB issued a decision prohibiting Mr. Beiene from
"representing and appearing on behalf of any person in any proceeding before all
Divisions of the Board."'' The IRB also noted that the prohibition would remain
in effect until such time as Mr. Beiene becomes a member of a bar of a province
or a licensed immigration consultant or until such time as he "furnishes proof
that satisfies the Board that he is not charging a fee for his services." 52 Although
ultimately the IRB did prohibit Mr. Beiene from continuing to represent persons
in IRB proceedings, this case nonetheless demonstrates the scope of the problem:
It is remarkable that Mr. Beiene was permitted to represent over four hundred
persons despite the fact that IRB staff suspected-or should have suspectedthat he was unlawfully charging fees for his services.
What this case-and the fact that this is currendy the only reported decision of
its kind' 53 -demonstrates is that the regulationspurporting to protect individuals
148. (15 May 2010), RPD 15.7, online: <http://www.irb.gc.ca/Eng/tribunal/decisions/beiene/
Documents/BEIENE3a.pdf>.
149. Ibid at paras 1-5.
150. Ibidat paras 7-11.
151. Ibid atpara 24.
152. Ibid.
153. The only other case citing the PolicyforHandlingIRB Complaints Regarding Unauthorized,
PaidRepresentatives is Domantay v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), [20081
FC 755 (TD). In this decision, the court refused an application for judicial review of an
Immigration Appeal Division decision where the applicant did not know that his paid
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appearing before the IRB by ensuring that their representatives are qualified and
maintain sound business practices (including maintaining insurance and abiding
by codes of professional conduct) do not appear to be effective in preventing
unauthorized representatives from serving as paid counsel in immigration and
refugee matters.
The government's recent legislative attempt at "Cracking Down on Crooked
Consultants'' aims to deal with this problem.' If declared into force, the legislation
would make it an offence to directly or indirectly represent or advise people for a fee
in connection with immigration and refugee applications and proceedings without
being a lawyer or a licensed immigration consultant.' The possible penalties would
include fines of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to two years.5 7
In my view, while this aspect of the legislation is a step in the right direction,
the prohibition against non-consultants and non-lawyers charging fees will be
difficult to enforce in its present form. Specifically, unless the victims of unauthorized consultants are provided with protection against removal from Canada,
they are unlikely to come forward with complaints. Moreover, while criminal
sanctions may well deter some "crooked consultants" from offering their services,
it is also predictable that-as with many enforcement mechanisms in the unlawful
migration sector-other "crooked consultants" will respond by continuing to
provide their services, but taking more strenuous measures (e.g., holding passports
or threatening family members) to prevent clients from reporting them to the
authorities, thereby increasing the vulnerabilities faced by migrants who will,
nonetheless, continue to use their services.
In this respect, it is telling that in the comments by the Minister noted above
in Part II(B)(1), 5 8 the possibility that "crooked consultants" might assist refu-

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

counsel was an unauthorized representative and where the IRB failed to take measures
to prevent the unauthorized representative from serving as counsel. In this decision the
court noted that "there is a duty incumbent on the Board to verify that those individuals
representing clients with whom it has dealings are authorized representatives pursuant to
the Regulations, or that they are not receiving a fee for their services" (ibidat para 19).
However, the court went on to hold that the IRB could nor be blamed in this case because
the applicant accepted his paid representative (a non-lawyer and non-immigration consultant
who worked for an immigration consultant) and that it is "not the obligation of the Board to
police the applicant's right to counsel" (ibidat para 26).
Crooked Consultants I, supra note 135 and Crooked Consultants I, supra note 136.
See e.g. Kenney, "Cracking Down," supra note 141; Kenney, "Crooked Consultants," supra
note 138.
Crooked Consultants II, supra note 136, s 1.
Ibid.
See text accompanying note 138.
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gee claimants to "concoct bogus stories" was presented as "worse still" than the
possibility that "[c] rooked immigration consultants victimize people who dream
of immigrating to Canada.""5 9 In light of the key finding of this study-that
competent and qualified counsel is a key driver of successful outcomes in refugee
claims-these comments by the Minister reflect a poor understanding of the
serious consequences for refugees of being represented by unauthorized counsel.
One might have hoped that the Minister-who is, after all, responsible for ensuring
that Canada meets its obligations under international refugee law-would
instead view the possibility that "crooked consultants" may cause individuals
who meet the refugee definition not to be accorded refugee protection as at least
as serious a problem as the possibility that some "crooked consultants" may put
forward false claims.

IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years there has been a great deal of public discussion about Canada's
refugee determination system, much of it framed in response to the arrival in
British Columbia of two ships of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka in 2009 and
2010.16 In these discussions, government actors have frequently spoken of
the need to get tough on human smugglers,161 "bogus refugees,"162 and "queue
jumpers." '63 Largely as a result of the perception that the current refugee
determination system is vulnerable to abuse, a series of legislative reforms have
been proposed, including the legislation passed by Parliament that will overhaul
the refugee determination process in the coming months. Unfortunately, lost in
much of the debate over the vulnerability of the refugee determination system to
abuse is a discussion of Canada's commitment to providing protection to those
who meet the refugee definition and of the ongoing procedural flaws in the system
that strives to determine who meets that definition. The present empirical study
of the effect of counsel on refugee claim outcomes highlights one of those flaws:

159. Kenney, "Crooked Consultants," supra note 138.
160. See e.g. Sunny Dhillon, "Canadians 'hardening,' Toews says," The Globe 6&Mail (20 January
2011) S2.
161. See e.g. Ian Bailey & Gloria Galloway, "Kenney insists on smuggling crackdown," The Globe
& Mail (22 October 2010) A9.
162. See e.g. Kenney, "Cracking Down," supra note 141.
163. See e.g. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Remarks by the Honourable Jason Kenney,
P.C., M.P., Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism an balanced refugee
reform" (30 March 2010), online: <http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/department/medial
speeches/20 10 / 2 0 1 0 - 0 3 - 3 0 .asp> [sic].
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Outcomes in the refugee determination process hinge in part on whether claimants
are represented by experienced lawyers.
This central finding must be understood in light of what this article has
demonstrated regarding the provincial legal aid programs that are supposed to
ensure that claimants can obtain such representation, namely that legal aid
programs are becoming increasingly restrictive and that merit screening processes
are sometimes applied in an arbitrary fashion. The result is that some people who
meet the refugee definition are likely not being recognized as such because they
cannot afford qualified counsel, a problem that is only going to be exacerbated
when the reforms to the refugee determination process come into effect in the
coming months. This not only places the lives of refugees at risk, but may also
leave Canada in breach of our obligations under international refugee law. To
prevent these risks and to ensure that Canada meets its international legal obligations, the federal government should transfer adequate funds to provincial legal
aid programs to ensure that all refugee claimants who meet reasonable financial
eligibility requirements are provided with counsel.
At the same time, the government should not miss the opportunity posed by
the recent spate of legislative reforms in the refugee law context to reconsider the
role of immigration consultants in the refugee determination process. The 9tudy
has shown not only that consultants are more likely to bring forward claims that
are later withdrawn or declared abandoned and are less likely than lawyers to be
successful in refugee claims decided on the merits, but also that the immigration
consulting industry has lost the confidence of the public. Until such time as
this confidence is regained and the immigration consulting industry establishes
a solid track record of ensuring that consultants meet standards of professional
conduct (and that unqualified consultants are no longer operating), immigration consultants should not provide unsupervised representation in high stakes
refugee determinations.
The present study has shown the importance of competent and qualified
counsel in life and death refugee claim determinations. It is incumbent upon
the federal government to ensure that refugee claimants are represented by
competent and qualified counsel in order to ensure the fairness of the refugee
determination process.

